On a Paradox

It is a curious paradox, one that I am very familiar with and have spent a great amount of effort contemplating.

The two mutually exclusive sides of the paradox are firstly, the criticism of intellectualism itself in favor of simplicity, and secondly, the criticism of simplicity in favor of intellectualism.

To my knowledge, there are three basic components to the former. First, it is vouched that intellectualism results in a reduced capacity to perceive or accept what may be called the "simple truths" of life. Second, it is vouched that this first item has the common effect of causing an unfavorable arrogance and pride, as the state of being intellectual is perceived as a shield of immunity from the criticism of those less informed. Third, it is vouched that this second item will develop into elitism, a social paradigm wherein the intellectual perceives himself as a member of an advanced hierarchy of human society, in essence differentiated and "set apart" from those less knowledgeable. This final stage is the most revolting as it associates a hierarchy on a scale of knowledge with an inherently moral paradigm, i.e. it states that it is essentially "good" to exist in the higher regions of this hierarchy and essentially "evil" to remain content to exist in the lower regions of the hierarchy.

The responding argument levied by intellectualism against the above charges almost inevitably varies, and I have encountered many versions of this argument that I consider to be atrociously constructed. For the most part, I cannot much blame anyone who has encountered many of these arguments for siding with the cause of simplicity. However, I would take the case of intellectualism, and cite my own defense, which I hope is sufficiently reasonable to warrant at least an unbiased reception and consideration.

In response to the first of the afore-mentioned items, I would state that any form of intellectualism that results in an incapacity to perceive the valued "simple truths" of life is in error. However, I would also dare to claim that, in the case that these truths are perceived, with perfect empathy, and yet rejected or amended, it is not the place of the person in possession of less information to judge whether such rejection or amendment are correct or incorrect, but that such a judgment logically belongs to the person in possession of more information, by which they will not only acquire this right, but also the heightened responsibility inseparably associated with it. I might also mention that in my own personal experience, it is strikingly often the case that a person with less information will perceive complete rejection where only amendment exists, and that if they can be lead to comprehend the entire thought at hand, they will often find that they are actually in agreement with the final statement, even though they perceived it as absolutely incorrect before, that being merely due to the case that it was imagined to be complete rejection, something they cannot admit.

In response to the second afore-mentioned item, I would state that any form of intellectualism that results in a perceived immunity to the criticism of the less informed is in error. However, I would state that, in my experience, it is more difficult to assess whether or not this is the case than some might imagine. To the intellectual, the admission of criticism as an equally valid hypothesis to his own current belief is the highest order of reception, and in my experience, this type of reception is in fact often extended to the criticisms of others by the intellectual. The reasons that this fact may not be perceived by others vary, but include in part first, the chance that the intellectual is already in possession of the criticism and sees no need to express this fact, second, the possibility that the intellectual's expressed position is merely a position held status quo pending a final conclusion, and third, the case that the intellectual deems his position to be operant on a higher order logic than that assumed by the criticism, rendering the criticism a non sequitur. It is also my opinion that this first stated reason, operating as often as it does in the intellectual, is a concept rarely understood by his critic. Few who levy their criticism with passion and resolve for their beliefs know the great burden of the true intellectual, who alone is haunted by his familiarity with both parties and tormented with the responsibility of choice. It is far easier to believe one thing and criticize all else than it is to determine to know all things and assume the responsibility to ascertain the truth. And though that latter task may be condemned by the religious, who posit the perfectly reasonable argument that man is incapable of the task, yet it is rare to find the man of faith courageous enough to determine both to have faith and to know all things. The majority would rather conceal their cowardice and impotence behind the argument just mentioned, preferring rather to condemn everything than to "examine everything."

Finally, in response to the third of the afore-mentioned items, I would argue that the side of intellectualism, that considers increased knowledge to have a moral quality of "good" and the rejection of knowledge to have a moral quality of "evil," is indeed a correct judgment. The problem, therefore, is not the original judgment, but rather, those that follow it causally, and here is where the great problem of our modern civilization lies. Too often in our day and age the possession of knowledge is deemed a mere resource, an advantage to be used to exploit and dominate those lacking it. Individual pragmatism, industry, a social and economic environment in which information is as much a currency as gold have led to an attitude of jealousy and animosity between those with knowledge and those without. The glory appropriated the intellectual for his defeat of another and the shame attributed to the non-intellectual are erroneous. Worst of all, this attitude has infiltrated academia, where similar attitudes of elitism are applauded. We have forgotten the ancient attitude toward knowledge and the correct conclusion of the thought. If knowledge is the "good" and its rejection the "evil," the highest benefit, the socially and culturally pragmatic conclusion, is for its infusion into the race to become the responsibility of all those able to do so. This is the ancient way of treating knowledge and the ancient imperative placed upon its possessors--to become teachers, to ensure that it is preserved and made available to all. Were this the attitude of our society today there would be no such thing as elitism, and the negative perception of intellectualism would be replaced with gratitude and a common hope: that together our kind can pursue a better future.

That together we can achieve a better future.